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On understandings of intention: 
A response to Wedgwood
Michael haugh
“The big question is not whether actors under-
stand each other or not. The fact is that they do 
understand each other, that they will understand 
each other, but the catch is that they will under-
stand each other regardless of how they would 
be understood” (Garfinkel 1952: 367; cited in 
Heritage 1984: 119).
Abstract
In a recent paper, Wedgwood (2011) launches a simultaneous defense of inten-
tion recognition and a critique of the alleged neglect of cognition in interac-
tional approaches to communicative interaction. In this paper, I argue that this 
simultaneous critique and defense is deeply flawed on a number of counts. 
First, the “looser” notion of intention that Wedgwood proposes glosses over 
and even confounds various levels or types of intention, and for this reason is 
ultimately not falsifiable. Second, in the course of his argumentation, he con-
founds intention with intentionality and agency. Third, his claim that a focus on 
“local” intentions offers a more “fine-grained” and “explanatory analysis” is 
completely unwarranted in light of close examination of the data at hand. I 
argue that such an approach instead generates speculation that is analytically 
unproductive, and, does not account for the cognitively interdependent infer-
ences that underlie conversational interaction in addition to traditional mo-
nadic inferential processes. It is concluded that further discussions about the 
requirements that interaction places on cognition, including the question of 
the place of intention and intentionality can be productive, but only if research-
ers are cognizant of the different ways in which intention has been defined, 
and also the different analytical work to which intention is put by scholars in 
pragmatics.
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1.	 Introduction
In the introduction to a recent special issue of Intercultural Pragmatics 
on “Intention in pragmatics,” I noted that raising questions about the place 
of intention in analyses of pragmatic phenomena can generate a range of in-
compatible responses, “ranging from ‘believers’ through to ‘skeptics’ (with 
perhaps not a few ‘agnostics’ in-between)” (Haugh 2008a: 106). I chose this 
analogy with discussions about religion quite deliberately. It seemed to me that 
while such discussions could become rather heated, they nevertheless could 
hold considerable value if they allowed us to deepen our understanding of 
meaning beyond what is said, social actions, and relational and identity phe-
nomena in communicative interaction, all of which seem to constitute pretty 
core business in pragmatics, at least as broadly construed. The flipside of the 
intrinsic value such discussions promise is that rather dogmatic or vitriolic re-
sponses can also eventuate. The special issue on “Intention in pragmatics” was 
offered largely as a response to Levinson’s (2006a, 2006b) call to elevate 
Gricean intentions to the “heart” of cognition in interaction, as Levinson’s call 
seemed, in my view, a somewhat reactionary move. While there can be no 
doubt that Grice’s work on speaker meaning and conversational implicature 
has contributed immeasurably to the discipline of pragmatics, and it should 
be respected as such, my aim in editing this special issue was to stimulate dis-
cussion about both the characterization and scope of intention in theorizing 
pragmatics. A range of scholars with very different understandings of intention 
and the role it plays in the analysis of meaning, and communication more 
broadly, contributed to the special issue. My hope was that in recognizing in-
tention does different work in different arms of pragmatics, we could start 
work on comparing and analyzing those differences in a way that moved our 
understandings forward in a productive manner. I also argued that no matter 
what our views might be on the place of (Gricean) intentions, “there remains a 
need to account for the cognition that underlies interaction” (Haugh 2008a: 
102).
It is against this background that I wish to respond to a recent article 
 published by Wedgwood (2011) that launches what appears to be, on the one 
hand, a withering critique of “interactional” approaches to communicative in-
teraction in claiming that such approaches make “implicit appeals to the very 
individual-, utterance-, and intention-based reasoning that they claim to reject” 
(523), and, on the other hand, a spirited defense of the capacity of “cognitive” 
approaches to account for the “contingencies of actual communicative interac-
tion” (525). He focuses on work by Arundale (2008) that was published as part 
of the aforementioned special issue, as well as papers by myself that were 
published elsewhere (Haugh 2008c, 2009) as the specific target for his critique 
of “interactional” approaches, and his concurrent defense of intention recogni-
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tion as being at the heart of communication and “cognitive” approaches more 
broadly.
Arundale (this issue), in his response, addresses the flaws in Wedgwood’s 
arguments in relation to understandings of communication. He focuses on 
Wedgwood’s unwarranted attempt to create a “strawman,” namely, that cogni-
tive and “discourse-level” pragmatics are in conflict, which arises, in turn, 
from his complete misrepresentation of the “necessary but not sufficient” argu-
ment that we both made in relation to the place of individual and utterance-
level phenomena in analyzing communicative interaction. He also critically 
considers Wedgwood’s claim that the “dynamism, interaction, and emergence 
of meaning . . . are wholly compatible with, indeed intrinsic to, a fully worked 
out individual-based pragmatic theory” (Wedgwood 2011: 520). Against the 
background of Arundale’s (this issue) response, I would like to focus here spe-
cifically on the issue of intention and its place in the analysis of communicative 
interaction.
My argument is that the simultaneous critique and defense that Wedgwood’s 
(2011) paper attempts in relation to intention is deeply flawed on a number of 
counts. I would like to note from the outset, however, that my response here is 
in no way intended as a final word on this issue, but rather is modestly offered 
as one step forward in unraveling the complex issues that any discussion of the 
place of intention in pragmatic theorization entails. I start in that vein, in sec-
tion two, by first giving a brief overview of the different ways in which inten-
tion has been defined, and also the different analytical work to which intention 
is put by scholars in pragmatics. I then compare this to the “looser” notion of 
intention that Wedgwood proposes, arguing that his notion of intention glosses 
over and even confounds various levels or types of intention, and for this rea-
son is ultimately unfalsifiable. I then consider Wedgwood’s arguments in rela-
tion to the alleged centrality of intention in communication in section three. I 
suggest here that Wedgwood’s “catholic and relatively weak notion” of inten-
tion becomes simply incoherent, as he confounds intention with intentionality 
and agency in the course of his argumentation, and so unwittingly conflates 
very different understandings of intention. I then move in section four to con-
sider the vexed issue of “locating” intentions in communicative interaction, 
and argue that Wedgwood’s claim that a local intention-based analysis of con-
versational interaction offers a more “fine-grained” and “explanatory analysis” 
is completely unwarranted in light of close examination of the data at hand. 
I reiterate that such an approach generates speculation that is analytically un-
productive and does not account for the cognitively interdependent inferences 
that underlie conversational interaction in addition to traditional monadic in-
ferential processes. I conclude in section five by suggesting that it is only by 
employing multiple methodological perspectives to carefully unpack our mul-
tiple (and sometimes competing) understandings of intention, intentionality 
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and other relevant cognitive states, as well the analytical work such notions 
do, that we will further our understanding of cognition for interaction, which 
Levinson (2006a, 2006b) has quite rightly called for, in more productive ways.
2.	 On	understanding	intention(s)	and	intentionality1
It is considered axiomatic by many in pragmatics that communication involves 
speakers expressing a particular type of complex intention through utterances, 
and addressees recognizing and attributing those intentions to speakers through 
inferences. It is most commonly claimed that this intention is of the kind orig-
inally proposed by Grice (1957), namely, the speaker “intended the utterance 
of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this 
intention” (385), or some modified version of this. This type of intention is 
variously termed a Gricean, communicative, or meaning intention. It is also 
generally accepted, largely following the seminal work of Grice, that this com-
municative intention involves at least one layer of reflexivity, namely, that 
 embedded within a second-order communicative intention is a first-order in-
formative or referential intention. In other words, a communicative intention 
involves a first-order intention (i.e., to intend to inform or represent some-
thing), which is embedded in a second-order intention (i.e., to intend that this 
first-order intention be recognized by the addressee).2 It has also been argued 
that in some instances, first-order intentions are not embedded in a second-
order communicative intention but rather in a second-order “manipulative” or 
“covert” intention (Németh T. 2008; Taillard 2003), in order to account for 
instances in which speakers want to inform addressees of something without 
necessarily being held as intending that. But no matter whether we are talking 
about communicative or covert/manipulative intentions, it is generally ac-
cepted that such intentions constitute a priori mental states that proceed the 
formulation of an utterance (Gibbs 1999).3 There are two key points to con-
sider when conceptualizing communicative intentions in this way. First, com-
municative intentions are not the only kind of intention potentially relevant to 
the analysis of communicative interaction. Second, the notion of intention is 
deployed for a range of different analytical purposes in pragmatics, which 
has implications for the extent to which communicative intentions are relevant 
for the analysis of conversational interaction. As we shall later see, the first 
point is barely addressed by Wedgwood (2011), while the latter is completely 
neglected.
2.1. On types of intention
Communicative intentions are clearly not the only kind of intention potentially 
relevant to the analysis of communicative interaction. According to Searle 
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(1983), they lie within the broader category of prior intentions, a category he 
proposed in order to contrast this kind of intention with intentions-in-action or 
“motor intentions,” which are hypothesized to constitute “the proximal cause 
of the physiological chain leading to overt behaviour” (Ciaramidaro et al. 
2007: 3106). Putting aside the issue of “motor intentions” for now, it has be-
come evident that prior intentions are not exhausted by communicative or 
 manipulative intentions. A range of other different types of prior intentions 
have been proposed, including higher-order intentions (sometimes also called 
 future-directed or prospective intentions) (Bratman 1999), private intentions 
 (Airenti, Bara, and Colombetti 1993), and we-intentions (Searle 1990) (cf. 
Bara 2011: 450 – 451). We-intentions are generally contrasted with I(ndividual)-
intentions. Prior intentions that lie solely in mental space of the speaker (i.e., 
I-intentions) can be categorized relative to two dimensions: (1) private versus 
social intentions, and (2) proximal/recursive versus future-directed/­prospective 
intentions.
Private intentions (whether proximal or distal) involve the representation of 
a goal that ostensibly involves only the speaker. However, since the pursuit of 
private goals by individuals (e.g., the addressee reaching into her purse to pay 
for coffee) may enter into the attended context of other individuals (e.g., an-
other individual concerned about who is going to pay for the coffee), infer-
ences about ostensibly private intentions may nonetheless be relevant to the 
formulation of social intentions (Haugh and Jaszczolt 2012: 99).
Higher-order intentions are proposed to account for the planning of future 
social actions, activity types and the prospective goals of speakers that involve 
other individuals, as opposed to proximal intentions, such as communicative 
Figure 1. Types of prior I-intentions
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intentions, which are directed at current utterances or actions in the present 
moment. While it has been traditionally assumed that meanings, including im-
plicatures, can be analyzed solely in terms of communicative intentions, this 
view is difficult to reconcile with decades of work demonstrating that meaning 
arises in the course of “delivering” actions (Austin 1962; Levinson forthcom-
ing; cf. Wedgwood 2011: 540, fn. 13), particularly in the case of communica-
tive interaction. Recent work by relevance theorists (Ruhi 2007) and neo-
Gricean theorists (Levinson 2011), for example, has illustrated the analytical 
import of higher-order intentions for the analysis of (speaker) meaning. On 
their view, then, it makes no sense to divorce consideration of higher-order 
intentions (potentially) relevant to the analysis of social actions, activity types 
and the like from a consideration of communicative intentions if they are ar-
gued to be relevant to the analysis of utterance-meaning.
In contrast to I-intentions, we-intentions are hypothesized to account for the 
fact that underlying cooperative activities, such as playing football, is a primi-
tive form of intentionality, namely, “we intend that we perform act A” (Searle 
1990: 407).4 While some have argued we-intentions (or shared intentions) can 
be reduced to I-intentions supplemented with mutual beliefs (Bratman 1999; 
Pacherie 2007; Tuomela and Miller 1988), this has proven to be cognitively 
implausible due to the strenuous requirement for sharedness (Becchio and 
 Bertone 2004: 127–128). The essence of the argument behind we-intentions is 
that individual members of a team I-intending, for example, particular ele-
ments of a pass play does not straightforwardly result (in a summative sense) 
in the collective action of a pass play. This is because, as Haugh and Jaszczolt 
(2012) argue, in the course of we-intending engagement in that kind of collec-
tive activity, “each team member’s I-intentions are responsive to their percep-
tions of the I-intentions of other team members, meaning, in other words, that 
the I-intentions of team members are both afforded and constrained by the 
 I-intentions of others in making the pass play” (100). It has been suggested that 
we-intentions may also be relevant to the analysis of communicative interac-
tion, since it also involves a kind of collective action (Clark 1996; Gibbs 1999; 
Searle 1990: 415).
However, while the notion of we-intentions has been proposed as a means 
of solving the problem of accounting for conversational interaction as a funda-
mentally joint activity, there are a number of challenges facing such a proposal. 
One problem is that we do not know enough about we-intentions yet, a conse-
quence perhaps of their inherent ontological ambiguity as to whether they are 
prior or post facto/emergent mental states (Haugh 2008c: 53–54). We also do 
not yet understand well the mechanisms by which they could come to be shared 
between two or more people in the first place. The fact that we-intentions also 
entail a narrow focus on achieving particular aims or goals is another possible 
limitation of the notion of we-intentions, especially when one considers that 
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the intentional cognitive states-processes which underpin collective activities 
are much broader in scope, potentially encompassing beliefs, expectations, 
( joint) commitments, attitudes, and the like.
It is important to note that many of these different types of intention were 
originally proposed as theoretical constructs to be deployed for analytical pur-
poses by philosophers. However, it is apparent that many researchers in prag-
matics are now committed to the assumption that such intentions constitute 
real cognitive states. Indeed, there is evidence emerging from experiments in 
neuroscience investigating the neural correlates of our ability to attribute men-
tal states that supports the drawing of the theoretical distinctions I have dis-
cussed here (Bara 2010, 2011; Noordzij et al. 2010).5 Some might therefore 
claim that such studies “prove” that the attribution of communicative (and 
other types of ) intentions lies at the core of cognition in communicative inter-
action. However, I would caution that such work only lends support in princi-
ple to drawing distinctions between private versus socially oriented or distal 
versus prospective mental state-processes, for instance. It does not constitute 
evidence of the existence of particular putative intentions per se. Labeling dif-
ferent neural activity as evidence of representations of or inferential work 
about various kinds of intention involves an underlying assumption that such 
work does not directly address, namely, that we are dealing with intentions 
here and not something else.
2.2. On uses of intention in pragmatics
A second consequence of the received understanding of communicative inten-
tions as a priori mental states that proceed the formulation of an utterance is 
that it is assumed, albeit often tacitly, that these intentions are necessarily di-
rected at an “object,” and so are “intentional” in the broadly philosophical 
sense of the ability of the mind to represent objects, properties, or states of af-
fairs (Haugh and Jaszczolt 2012: 88). While intentions and intentionality are 
often confounded, they are in fact distinct analytical concepts. A key claim in 
relation to the latter is that certain mental states are intentional in the sense that 
they are about something, that is, they have an object. Intentional mental states 
include beliefs, desires, wants, thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and, of course, 
intentions, among other things. Intentional mental state-processes include 
 attention/attending, perceptions/perceiving, inferences/inferring, evaluations/
evaluating, interpretations/interpreting, and the like. It is an open question just 
how “conscious” intentionality might be. One might argue that while inten-
tional mental states may not always be salient or consciously entertained 
by individuals, they are nevertheless always available for introspection. On 
the other hand, one might argue that the default or routine nature of many 
 instances of such mental states-processes might preclude their conscious 
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 availability at times. It would thus be fair to conclude that intentional mental 
states, including arguably intentions, are marked by epistemological ambiguity 
as to their degree of conscious recall.
A corollary of the assumption that certain mental states, and thus linguistic 
acts, are intentional (Haugh and Jasczcolt 2012: 92–93), is the deontological 
notion of intention, and intentionality more broadly. This is generally framed 
in the literature as either speaker or joint commitment (Brandom 1994; 
Morency, Oswald, and de Sassure 2008; cf. Garmendia 2011), or, alternatively, 
accountability (Garfinkel 1967; Sacks [1964]1992: 4 –5). The former notion is 
defined in various ways, including the degree to which an individual is held to 
be committed to the truth conditions of an utterance (Searle 2007: 33–34), or 
two or more individuals are held to be jointly committed to undertaking a col-
lective action (Gilbert 2009), for instance. The latter refers to the ways in 
which individuals hold themselves and others normatively accountable for the 
meanings and actions that arise from what is said (and done); for instance, 
through topicalizing intentions (Haugh 2008b, 2008c; Edwards 2008). Since 
speaker commitment or accountability is inherently a discursive construct, it 
is always open to dispute. It is in this sense that we can talk about the “nego-
tiation” of meaning in interaction. However, the deontological sense of inten-
tion (and intentionality) is not limited to such explicit disputes, but is instead 
an ever-present working assumption of conversational interactants, which un-
derlies the ways in which we normatively “make available” meanings through 
what we say, and are held committed to or accountable for making such mean-
ings available, even when it might not match our claimed intentions (in the 
folk, discursive sense).
It is worth noting that folk or intuitive senses of intend/intention (Gibbs 
1999: 22–23; cf. Bara 2010: 76 –77), which involve describing what oneself or 
others want to achieve by doing or saying something (i.e., as goal-oriented/
directed), or classifying actions as being done with the speaker’s awareness of 
the implications of them (i.e., as deliberate), among other things, are to some 
extent analogous to higher-order intentions. They differ, however, in that folk 
senses of intention are discursive constructs, which arise through evaluations 
by others of the speaker’s awareness of the implications of what he is saying or 
doing, and/or evaluations of what the speaker is aiming to do through the utter-
ance (or behavior more broadly). In other words, they involve a moral dimen-
sion (Knobe 2010). Higher-order intentions, on the other hand, are assumed to 
be rooted in some kind of cognitive reality, and so it is presumed that such 
mental states are causative of speakers’ actions, being accomplished through 
the workings of motor intentions (the latter of which are cognitive state-
processes but not representational or conceptual in nature).
While I have only briefly outlined here some of the ways in which intention 
(and intentionality) are discussed in the literature, it is quite apparent that the 
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notion of intention is deployed for a range of different analytical purposes in 
pragmatics. Intention can be used definitionally in the analysis of (speaker) 
meaning without any necessary commitment to its psychological reality, and in 
that sense constitutes a theoretical construct only. Intention may also be as-
sumed to constitute a crucial component of the cognitive activities involved in 
communicative interaction, and thus in that sense is a working analytical con-
struct, although in cognitive pragmatics a range of different types and levels 
of intentions are generally considered important for any analysis. Finally, in-
tention can be understood as a discursive construct, where the focus is on the 
normative work intention in the folk sense does in communicative interaction. 
My view is that it is important to distinguish between these different uses of the 
concept of intention and intentionality when considering the putative place of 
communicative intentions in communicative interaction.
2.3. On Wedgwood’s understanding of intention
The evident complexity of thinking about intentions and intentionality, and the 
different ways in which it is deployed in the literature contrasts markedly with 
Wedgwood’s (2011) approach. He claims that reasoning about a “local” or 
“utterance-level” intention, which he formulates as simply, “ ‘what the speaker 
wants to get across’ through a particular utterance, at the point at which it is 
formulated” (526), can successfully account for communication. He contrasts 
“local” intentions with “wider” intentions, which he characterizes rather 
loosely (and indeed with pernicious circularity) as, “the wider intentions that 
may be attributed to an individual’s behavior in a certain situation” (526), and 
goes on to make the claim that, “intention attribution models do not, and need 
not, aspire to explain these wider intentions directly” (526). Finally, he asserts 
that “local” intentions need not be fully “conscious” and in some instances 
may be “subconscious and/or vague” (527).
The first thing one might note about Wedgwood’s characterization of inten-
tion is that it is strikingly simplistic. Although he purports to be “defending” 
cognitive approaches, his exposition of intention hardly does such approaches 
any justice at all. And while claiming that “local” intentions underlie all the 
utterances that constitute a communicative interaction, Wedgwood does not 
provide any account of how such intentions are realized in communication. 
More problematically, he does not address how his notion of “local” intention 
might figure in a model of utterance interpretation, let alone a model of com-
munication. He thus does not explain how individuals might come to share, 
even if only partially, understandings of these intentions, but rather seems con-
tent to simply assert that addressees figure out these intentions from what 
speakers say. This completely glosses over the complex reflexivity required of 
an intention-based explanation of communication.
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Let us consider, for instance, Levinson’s (1983) example of an implicature 
that arises in the context of the following request sequence:
(1)
1 A: Hullo I was wondering whether you were intending to go to
  Popper’s talk this afternoon
2 B: Not today I’m afraid I can’t make it to this one
3 A: Ah okay
4 B: You wanted me to record it didn’t you heh!
5 A: Yeah heheh
6 B: Heheh no I’m sorry about that . . . (Levinson 1983: 358)
While Haugh (2009: 94 –97) focused on the temporal, ontological and epis-
temological ambiguity that surrounds A’s alleged communicative intention un-
derlying his utterance in turn 1, we could nevertheless hypothesize (although 
based on a post-facto analysis) that B did indeed attribute a communicative 
intention to A upon hearing his utterance in turn 1. Specifically, that A was in-
tending to check whether it would be possible for B record Popper’s talk for 
him (i.e., what could be said to be implied by A in turn 1). However, in order 
for B to infer this communicative intention, he would necessarily also have to 
make an inference about A’s (possible) higher-order intention, namely, his in-
tention to make a request, as it is only in the context of the latter that the former 
inference would be plausible. One might also add that this presupposes, in turn, 
that A and B are we-intending engagement in (or are jointly committed to) the 
possibility of getting something done (i.e., arranging a recording of the talk) as 
opposed to simply exchanging information about each other’s activities, since 
that higher-order intention would, in turn, only be consistent with the former 
interpretive frame. As Haugh and Jaszczolt (2012) note, this means that any 
putative “communicative intention of A is embedded within his higher-order 
intention, with both intentions arguably being further embedded within a we-
intention” (101). It is this requirement for multiple types of prior intentions to 
be embedded within each other that leads to the temporal and ontological am-
biguity that Haugh (2008c, 2009) originally noted in relation to the place of 
communicative intentions in analyzing implicatures. Such an analysis directly 
contradicts Wedgwood’s (2011: 526) claim that “wider” intentions are indi-
cated through recognition of “local” intentions. It suggests the very opposite, 
namely, that in many cases, “local” intentions could only be attributed in in-
stances where “wider” intentions (which might more properly be termed 
higher-order intentions, private intentions, we-intentions) are also at play.
The second thing one might note about Wedgwood’s (2011) characterization 
of intention is that it is inconsistent. He suggests that the ambiguities surround-
ing communicative or “local” intentions can be resolved by admitting the pos-
sibility of subconscious or vague intentions (527–528). One problem is that 
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Wedgwood conflates in his argument for subconscious or vague intentions the 
issues of the relative (in)determinacy of intentions (in the folk sense) and the 
(in)determinacy of meaning, when they are in fact analytically distinct matters. 
As Wilson and Sperber (1986) quite rightly pointed out, pragmatic meanings 
such as implicatures vary in their degree of strength. Speakers may be held 
more or less committed to the truth of particular implicated assumptions or 
conclusions, for instance, and the conceptual or informational content of impli-
catures may also vary in its degree of determinacy. But the indeterminacy of 
various types of pragmatic meaning should not be conflated with the degree of 
“vagueness” of the speaker’s alleged intention (Haugh in press a). It may be 
quite clear to the addressee, for instance, that the speaker does not intend to 
answer a question more clearly when discussing delicate matters. In such 
cases, the meaning representation itself may be fairly indeterminate, but the 
speaker’s intention may be regarded as quite clear, if indeed the participants 
orient to it. In other instances, the speaker’s intention to mean something may 
indeed be evaluated as vague by others, yet the meaning representation itself 
may be quite determinate. The indeterminacy of meaning therefore cannot ex-
plain in and of itself the alleged ambiguity of putative communicative or 
 “local” intentions.
Another problem is that Wedgwood generates theoretical incoherence in his 
own account through his move to admit subconscious or vague intentions. He 
claims that, “the key role for intentions in a broadly Gricean framework is not 
to ‘guide or motivate speakers,’ but to trigger and guide the act of communica-
tion” (Wedgwood 2011: 527), yet subsequently argues, contra to his earlier 
claim, that intention should be broadened to include “subconscious motiva-
tions” (530, emphasis added). He offers as an example of this, the case of com-
municative accommodation in which a speaker’s accent can subtly converge 
with or diverge with another interlocutor’s accent as a sign of solidarity or 
distance. From this example it appears that Wedgwood is arguing that speakers 
may have “subconscious intentions” about which addressees may make “sub-
conscious inferences,” and that while neither the speaker nor the addressee are 
aware of this, it nevertheless constitutes communication. The problem here is 
that proposing a notion of subconscious communicative intentions is clearly 
paradoxical (Bara 2010: ix, 87). It is also ultimately empirically unfalsifiable. 
If a “local” intention can, as Wedgwood appears to claim (2011: 528), arise in 
relation to something that the speaker is not aware he or she wishes to get 
across, and is not sure what it is that he or she wants to get across, and the ad-
dressee is also not aware that he or she is attributing an intention to the speaker 
to get across something about which the speaker is not sure what he or she 
wants to get across, one wonders how one could possibly demonstrate either 
the presence or absence of such intentions. One also wonders if there is any 
inherent value in attempting to do so, except, perhaps to mount a defense of an 
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approach to communicative interaction that attempts to pin everything to 
speaker intentions.
I have argued in this section that Wedgwood’s (2011) approach to intention 
is markedly out of step with other approaches to intention in pragmatics, and 
cognitive pragmatics specifically. He neglects the different types and uses of 
intention in pragmatics in postulating an intuitive but ultimately incoherent 
and empirically unfalsifiable notion of “local” intention. While he calls for a 
“highly nuanced view of the role of intentions in communication” (528), the 
simplistic notion of intention he defends does not do justice to such a call. 
In the following section, putting aside the problems evident in Wedgwood’s 
(2011) account of intention, I will consider the arguments that he forwards 
in support of his claim that intentions are “ineliminable from the theory 
of communication” (517), and, in particular, are “central to the analysis of 
“sociocultural-interactional” features of dialogue” (537), in order to illustrate 
the flaws in his line of argumentation.
3.	 On	the	“centrality”	of	intentions	in	communicative	interaction
Wedgwood (2011) makes two conjoined assertions in regard to the centrality 
of intentions in communication. He first asserts that intentions are (1) “indis-
pensable in the theory of how we communicate,” followed immediately by the 
claim that (2) “in the absence of some form of intention, speakers simply have 
no basis on which to formulate utterances” (530). These two assertions are 
placed as if one supports the other, but therein lies the essential problem with 
Wedgwood’s argument: His lack of recognition that there are different types of 
intention, including most crucially higher-order/folk intentions, which are not 
of the same order as communicative or “local” intentions, and a lack of aware-
ness that there are different uses to which intention is put to work in pragmatics 
(including intention/intend in the folk sense). He offers three related lines of 
argumentation to bolster his claims: (1) all utterances must be “motivated” by 
something, and that something is “local” intentions, (2) miscommunication 
can only be explained with respect to “local” intentions, and (3) interactional 
accounts cannot do without appeals to “local” intention-based reasoning. Close 
examination of the arguments that Wedgwood offers, however, illustrates how 
different treatments of intention are confounded in the course of his argumen-
tation, in particular, between intention and intentionality more broadly, and 
between intention as an analytic as opposed to a discursive concept.
The first line of argumentation draws on the idea that all utterances are 
 “motivated,” and, thus, that “intentions” must underlie all communication, and 
indeed are “definitional of the kind of communication humans engage in” 
(Wedgwood 2011: 531). This idea is recycled a number of times, but the 
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 following excerpt gives an idea of the underlying thrust of Wedgwood’s 
 argument:
We do not produce utterances randomly, with no sense of the effects they might 
have — and if anyone did this, it would clearly not constitute communication. Utter-
ances are motivated, even when the motivation is subconscious or relatively hard to 
define. Accordingly, they do not license an unrestricted range of interpretations. [ . . . ] 
Thus, the intention behind an utterance is a crucial motivation and guide to the process 
of interpretation, as well as production. (Wedgwood 2011: 530)
The problem here is that Wedgwood confounds the intentionality of linguistic 
acts with the more limited notion of intention. We are generally held account-
able for the utterances we produce and the meanings, actions, evaluations, and 
so on that they give rise to (although this stricture might be somewhat loosened 
in some circumstances, such as when the speaker is evidently drunk or other-
wise mentally incapacitated). An implicature, for instance, is, by definition, an 
unsaid meaning for which a speaker is held committed to, or accountable 
for — as opposed to, say, a perception of or inference about a person, for which 
we cannot always be held accountable (Haugh in press b). The question is why 
a speaker can be held committed to, or accountable for that implicature even 
though it has not been expressed. The answer is not because a speaker is al-
ways held to intend what has been implied (see also Horn 2012), but rather lies 
in the assumed intentionality of linguistic acts and the presumed agency of 
speakers. Linguistic acts are held to be directed, to be about something, and 
we are presumed to be exercising our agency in producing them. This is why 
we are held accountable for producing them. How addressees figure out 
what these linguistic acts are about is a separate question. But at this point it is 
worth remembering that intentionality covers a much broader spectrum than 
simply intentions, and thus so does agency. To argue that all utterances must 
be “motivated” and thus intentions underlie all communication entirely misses 
the crucial distinction between intention and intentionality, and the fact that 
speaker accountability arises as a consequence of presumptions about inten-
tionality and agency, not intentions as narrowly construed by Wedgwood.
Indeed, once we consider the broader notions of intentionality and account-
ability, a narrow focus on intentions in communicative interaction seems 
somewhat unwarranted. It is worth remembering that we inherited this focus 
on communicative intentions from Grice (1957) who was originally interested 
in speaker meaning. However, we don’t just mean things in interaction (putting 
aside the issue of whether one might define that solely in terms of putative 
speaker intentions), we also do things, we think things, we believe things, we 
feel things, we evaluate things, and so on and so forth. And participants in 
communicative interactions are clearly interested in those putative intentional 
states as well. A singular focus on intention/intending seems to unnecessarily 
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narrow the scope of our analytical interest in conversational interaction. It is 
for this reason that I called for a consideration of intentionality more broadly 
in the analysis of communicative interaction (Haugh 2008c, 2009, 2012).
In light of that, Wedgwood’s (2011: 528) attempt to boil down all 
 “sociocultural-interactional” features of dialogue, such as “to appear polite,” 
“to maintain social relationships,” or “to project a certain attitude or mood” to 
recognition of intentions seems totally unnecessary. Why should one attempt 
to explain such interpersonal phenomena relative to “local” (whether vague or 
not) intentions in the first place? The addressee can make inferences about the 
speaker’s attitudes toward or evaluations of the addressee (or his or her rela-
tionship with speaker) in such cases without having to entertain inferences 
about the speaker’s intentions, no matter how we define them. While there is 
no doubt inferences about the speaker’s (communicative, higher-order, folk) 
intentions could arise in certain situations, there is simply no requirement that 
the addressee make any inferences about the speaker’s intentions here, sub-
conscious or not. While there is not sufficient space here to elaborate, particu-
larly given the massive literature on “sociocultural-interactional” features of 
dialogue, a consideration of how the definition of impoliteness has changed in 
light of empirical study proves a case in point. While impoliteness was initially 
understood as a kind of intended/intentional face attack (e.g., Culpeper 2005: 
38), the most comprehensive study of impoliteness to date has demonstrated 
that it is sustained by “expectations, desires and/or beliefs about social organi-
sation,” and that while “understand[ing] a behaviour to be strongly intentional 
or not” can “exacerbate how offensive an impolite behaviour is taken to be” the 
latter is not critical to it (Culpeper 2011: 23). In other words, it is intentional 
states other than intentions, such as beliefs, desires, or expectations that argu-
ably prove critical to our understanding of impoliteness.6
The second line of argument draws on the idea that in some cases “misinter-
pretations” arise, for instance, where speakers may claim they did not “intend” 
what they have been taken by others to mean by a particular utterance. Based 
on this it is claimed that “intentions” are central to any account of successful 
and unsuccessful communication.
To define misinterpretation requires reference to conflict with the speaker’s intentions. 
[ . . . ] It is thus clear that language users rely on the notion of speakers’ intentions to 
distinguish successful from unsuccessful communication [ . . . ] and that this distinction 
is important, given the potentially significant practical, social, and emotional conse-
quences of having unintended meanings attributed to one’s utterances. (Wedgwood 
2011: 532)
The problem here is that Wedgwood confounds an analytic with a discursive 
understanding of intention. An analytic understanding of intention either treats 
it as a theoretical construct for the analysis of speaker meaning, or presumes it 
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has psychological reality as a casual intentional state in the production of ac-
tions or in utterance processing (the latter of which constitutes Wedgwood’s 
position). A discursive understanding of intention, on the other hand, treats it 
as a construct emerging through discourse that is used in folk teleological ex-
planations of “how we communicate,” and is thus open to discursive dispute 
(Edwards 2008; Haugh 2008b; Haugh and Jaszczolt 2012: 109–111), including 
the “strong reactions” that speakers might have when “accused of meaning 
something they didn’t intend ” to which Wedgwood (2011: 532) makes refer-
ence. However, an examination of how intention/intending and so on are 
treated discursively by participants does not constitute evidence of the psycho-
logical reality of an analytic notion of intention in utterance processing. 
 Instead, a discursive understanding of intention involves a deontological per-
spective that inevitably engenders considerations of normativity in utterance 
interpretation, including (disputes about) what interpretation(s) a particular ut-
terance makes available. It is worth remembering that in defending what is 
“meant” by a particular utterance (or longer discourse unit), speakers do not 
only appeal to what they intended, but may also invoke word meaning, con-
textual factors, sociocultural understandings, and so on and so forth (Haugh 
2008b). Indeed, repair in general involves much more than troubles in under-
standing alleged speaker intentions, contra to Wedgwood’s (2011: 532) claim, 
as any cursory examination of the literature on repair in conversation analysis 
would indicate (Schegloff 1987, 1991, 1992). For these reasons, appeals to 
one’s intention (a discursive notion) in defending what one really meant cannot 
be treated as direct evidence that “local” intentions (an analytic category) un-
derpin all utterance production and interpretation.
The third line of argumentation is that “interactional” accounts are not able 
to explain utterance interpretation without implicit appeals to the “intention-
based reasoning that they claim to reject” (Wedgwood 2011: 523). I will go on 
to argue in more detail in the following section that such a claim is vacuous. 
However, it is nevertheless worth considering further the kinds of cognitive 
states and processes that might underlie communicative interaction, since this 
is an obvious area of common interest between “cognitive” and “interactional” 
approaches, contra Wedgwood’s misrepresentation of my position and Arun-
dale’s (this issue). But perhaps to put it more precisely, the question is: What 
cognitive states and processes are required to account for communicative inter-
action? And are intentions always necessarily postulated in such an account?
Given that there are different uses of intention in interaction (including the 
discursive co-construction of intention/intend in the folk sense), it seems trivial 
to claim that a theory of communication must deal with the fact that speakers 
do “at times have particular motivations or plans underlying what they are say-
ing, or that recipients do not at times make inferences about what has moti-
vated the speaker to say something” (Haugh 2009: 93, emphasis added). Of 
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course it does, because we evidently do have interactional “goals” or “motiva-
tions” that we do entertain at certain times when communicating with others. 
And I am certainly not unsympathetic to the idea that “goals” or “motivations” 
may sometimes be subconscious (Bargh and Williams 2006; Evans 2008; 
 Uleman, Saribay, and Gonzalez 2008). In this sense, I would agree that any 
analysis of communicative interaction must account for the interactional 
“goals” we might have at times. We can conceptualize interactional “goals” or 
“motivations” as higher-order intentions (from a cognitive perspective) or as 
folk intentions (from a discursive perspective). However, as the discussion in 
the previous section has indicated, a folk or higher-order intention is not of the 
same order as a communicative intention or Wedgwood’s “local” intention. 
Thus, while I would agree that we should analyze higher-order or folk inten-
tions (depending on one’s perspective) in communicative interaction when 
there is empirical evidence that these are oriented to by participants, this does 
not mean that we should presume such “goals” always guide communication.
However, to allow for the analysis of higher-order/folk intentions in conver-
sational interaction does not automatically lend support to Wedgwood’s (2011) 
second claim that “local” intentions are the basis for formulating (and inter-
preting) utterances. Indeed, there is good reason to be cautious about the claim 
that communicative or “local” intentions are always the basis of utterance in-
terpretation. One is the burgeoning literature on default interpretations, namely, 
“a level of systematic pragmatic inference based not on direct computations 
about speaker-intentions but rather on general expectations about how lan-
guage is normally used” (Levinson 2000: 22). These are hypothesized by 
Levinson (1995, 2000) to help participants overcome the speech processing 
bottleneck. There is a growing experimental literature, however, indicating 
that default inferences are not computed locally from particular lexical items 
(see, for instance, Breheny, Katsos, and Williams 2006; Chevallier et al. 2008; 
Noveck 2001), but rather arise at the level of utterances and beyond (Jaszczolt 
and Allan 2011; Garret and Harnish 2007, 2009; Geurts 2010). Such inferences 
are “directed” at sociocultural (or cognitive) defaults and so are intentional in 
the philosophical sense. Speakers are thus held to be committed to, or account-
able for such default meanings, but since the whole raison d’etre of defaults 
is to avoid (complex) calculations about speaker intentions, such work evi-
dently undermines Wedgwood’s (2011) claims about the centrality of “local” 
intentions.
Recent work by scholars working from various “cognitive” perspectives 
also indicates that this assumption about the centrality of “local” intentions 
may not be warranted. Gil (2011), for instance, draws from empirical work in 
neurocognitive linguistics in arguing that, “there are many representations that 
are not intended by the speaker but inferred by the hearer on the basis of the 
speaker’s verbal behavior” (34), and thus, “human verbal interaction is much 
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more complex (and interesting) than” a singular focus on “information inten-
tionally transmitted by speakers and writers” allows for (3). Gregoromichelaki 
et al. (2011) propose in the context of the broader Dynamic Syntax program 
that utterance processing is more readily explained with reference to the “in-
cremental and monotonic growth of semantic representations,” and on the 
 basis of their modeling of so-called split utterances conclude that, “recognition 
of the context of speaker intentions is not a necessary condition of human in-
teraction” (200).7 And Gibbs (2012) argues with reference to psycholinguistic 
experiments of the production and processing of verbal irony that, “people’s 
ironic behaviors result from their self-organizing tendencies even before any 
intention to speak or write in certain ways ever reaches awareness” (Gibbs 
2012: 114). In other words, psychological research indicates that not all forms 
of irony are necessarily deliberate or even intentional. Such work also indi-
cates significant movements toward an account of cognition in interaction, as 
called for by Levinson (2006a, 2006b), among others. And while Wedgwood 
(2011) appears to assume that any “cognitive” account of communicative phe-
nomena would necessarily assume “local” intentions to be central, this as-
sumption appears increasingly unwarranted in light of various lines of research 
in cognitive pragmatics. It thus seems high time that an approach to theorizing 
cognition that addresses the requirements that our understandings of interac-
tion impose — cognition for interaction — be further developed. In this way, we 
can move away from the unnecessary constraints on the analysis of communi-
cative interaction that an attempt to boil down all interaction to “local” inten-
tions entails.
In the following section, I deal in more detail with Wedgwood’s (2011: 523) 
claim that an “interactional” analysis necessarily appeals to “intention-based 
reasoning,” as it is the validity (or not) of this charge that is ultimately the 
most telling as to the relative value of an “interactional” account of communi-
cation. I argue that such a charge is not only groundless, but also analytically 
unproductive.
4.	 On	“locating”	intentions	in	communicative	interaction
In recent work, I have discussed problems that arise when attempting to locate 
Gricean or communicative intentions in actual interactional data (Haugh 
2008c, 2009). Wedgwood (2011: 535–537) revisits one of my examples and 
argues for the necessity of an individual-, utterance-, and intention-based ac-
count of this interaction. It is difficult to untangle Wedgwood’s analysis from 
my own, as he completely misses my argument that an individual- and 
 utterance-based analysis is necessary but not sufficient to fully account for 
 interaction. In order to contextualize Wedgwood’s arguments, then, I will (1) 
 - 10.1515/ip-2012-0011
Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/15/2016 02:41:44AM
via free access
178 Michael Haugh
briefly outline the two key claims I was trying to make with reference to this 
particular example in my earlier papers (Haugh 2008c: 62– 64, 2009: 103–
104), and then (2) outline the approach to the “participant’s viewpoint” that 
was presumed in my analysis in order to counter Wedgwood’s caricature of it. 
I will next (3) unpack my analysis of this example, since it was necessarily 
compressed in the context of those two papers, in order to illustrate the close 
analysis of the data at hand that was involved. I will then (4) contrast this with 
the speculative interpretations Wedgwood offers, which arise as a consequence 
of his singular focus on framing utterance interpretation relative to putative 
“local” intentions. I conclude (5) by suggesting that the sociocognitive pro-
cesses we propose must be properly responsive to the demands of interaction, 
and reiterate why monadic processes are necessary but not sufficient in an ac-
count of cognition for interaction.
The excerpt that was revisited in Wedgwood’s (2011) recent critique is re-
produced below. I have included the original turn numbering on the right-hand 
side, since this excerpt is taken from the middle of a longer, 15-minute record-
ing of a conversation between Emma and Chris, who were meeting for the first 
time. The questions I raised about locating putative communicative intentions 
were specifically in relation to the interpretation of Chris’s utterance in turn 11.
(2) ERCH: 8:18–8:39
1 E: SO: (0.2) the:y (0.5) they aim to [216]
  learn to understand it [an:d ]=
2 C:  [right] [217]
3 E: =grow sensitive to it you know, [218]
  I’m like [( )]
4 C:  [yeah ] [219]
5  (0.6) [220]
6 C: °mmm° [221]
7  (0.2) [222]
8 E: and the needles happen to be one of [223]
  the most effective ways
  to (0.6) manipulate it
9 C: yea:h? [224]
10 E: mmmm [225]
11 → C: can you fix patellar tendonitis? °heh°  [226]
12  (1.7) [227]
13 E: ↑maybe ↑ye:ah [228]
14 C: yeah? [229]
15  (0.3) [230]
16 E: yeah you got that? [231]
17 C: I have yeah [232]
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I noted that, following this excerpt, Emma made an offer of treatment that was 
(tentatively) accepted by Chris (Haugh 2008c: 63, 2009: 104), and thus Chris’s 
utterance was evidently treated as request implicative. The question facing the 
analyst is how did Emma and Chris reach this understanding?
(1) In Haugh (2008c), my key claim was that “speculation about the inten-
tions of Chris, or what Emma interpreted as Chris’ intentions, is analytically 
unproductive in regards to determining what was implied” (64, emphasis 
added). I pointed out that Emma could not have been sure whether Chris had 
an a priori intention to raise the possibility of seeking treatment, or to teasingly 
challenge her, or even both, and we (i.e., the analysts) do not know for sure 
what interpretations of Chris’s utterance in turn 11 that Emma might have en-
tertained. What we do know is that Emma displayed an interpretation of Chris’s 
utterance as request implicative in her subsequent responses, and that Chris 
accepted this understanding in his subsequent responses.
In Haugh (2009), my key claim was that the “the inferencing underlying this 
implicature is necessarily interdependent,” by which I meant that, “Chris’s and 
Emma’s inferences about what is meant by Chris’s question in line 11 are de-
pendent on the other’s displays of the inferences they have made” (104). It thus 
follows, I argued, that we cannot simply talk about inferences made about 
 putative speaker intentions in interpreting utterances in isolation. Utterance 
interpretation occurs in sequentially organized discourse, and thus Chris and 
Emma’s inferential work about Chris’s utterance in turn 11 is necessarily de-
pendent on their inferences about each other’s inferences. In other words, in-
ferences about (speaker) meanings are always reflexive and contingent on the 
understandings by self and other displayed in prior and subsequent turns. This 
is what is meant, at least in part, by dyadic as opposed to monadic cognition 
(Arundale and Good 2002).
(2) In order to contextualize my analysis and expand upon it, it is worth 
first outlining the key principles upon which it builds, namely, those of ethno-
methodology and conversation analysis (Heritage 1984; Schegloff 2007). The 
primary one is that communicative interaction is fundamentally organized as 
a “vehicle of human action” (Schegloff 1991), and thus, any analysis of mean-
ing in interaction must necessarily be contextualized relative to social actions. 
I would not go as far as some to claim that the analysis of social actions is 
more important than meaning in conversational interaction, as any analysis 
of social action, in my view, necessarily presumes an analysis of the content 
of social actions, or what they are about (i.e., a request to x, an invitation to x 
and so on). Instead, I would simply suggest that meanings in communicative 
interaction always arise in the context of sequentially achieved social actions. 
Another key principle is that intersubjectivity in conversational interaction is 
locally managed and locally adapted (Schegloff 1992: 1138). This does not 
preclude abstraction away from localized interactions in theorizing meaning, 
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but it does mean any theorization must be responsive to the temporality and 
sequentiality that underpins the cognitive-interactional mechanisms underly-
ing meaning. It has also been demonstrated that that actions and meanings 
are implemented on a “turn-by-turn basis,” and “by means of this organization, 
a context of publicly displayed and continuously up-dated intersubjective 
 understandings is systematically sustained ” (Heritage 1984: 259, original em-
phasis). In other words, next turns provide evidence of the understandings 
of recipients of prior turns. However, it is important to note that such under-
standings are “indirectly exhibited in their own turns,” which means that, “a 
second speaker’s analysis of a prior is presented indirectly and must be in-
ferred” by others (Heritage 1984: 260). An analyst must therefore focus on 
evidence of participant’s  understanding displayed in current as well as in prior 
and next turns. It is also important to note that next turns do not necessarily 
display straightforward understandings of prior turns. Heritage (1984) cautions 
that
the ‘official’ treatments of talk occurring at the conversational surface are the starting 
point for interpretative and analytic work and cannot be treated simply as unproblem-
atic representations of what the speakers’ understandings or intentions in the talk con-
sisted of. (260, emphasis added)
In the case of analyzing implicatures or implicated actions, it is thus par-
ticularly important to draw on other sources of analytical evidence as well. 
This closely relates to yet another principle, namely, that participants may be 
“pursuing ‘possible understandings’ of turns at talk — including their own 
turns at talk — along multiple lines, and are thereby prepared to recognize even 
ones arrived at by others that might have been thought elusive” (Schegloff 
2006: 147, emphasis added). In other words, interpretations of utterances are 
initially always provisional as they are inevitably contingent on what follows. 
The final principle is that analyses should be grounded in prior research that 
demonstrates interactional practices that are found to be recurrent in situated 
discourse (including within the interaction in question) in order to attest to the 
relative plausibility of the “possible understandings” that are proposed. In 
other words, a putative understanding can be justified with reference to prior 
studies that illustrate recognizable (to the participants) ways of accomplishing 
such understandings.8 I might add that this approach to the analysis of the 
“participant’s perspective” is much more closely tied to the content and form 
of individual utterances (as well as how they are related in interactional se-
quences) than Wedgwood’s speculation about the possible intentions of Chris, 
despite his claims to the contrary (cf. Wedgwood 2011: 536).
(3) I now turn to the question of what justifies the analysis of Chris’s utter-
ance as either a possible challenging tease or as request implicative, which is 
what leads to analytical equivocality about his putative or alleged intentions. It 
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is important to start this analysis by noting that Chris’s utterance in turn 11 is 
in the basic form of a polar-interrogative (“can you fix patellar tendonitis”), 
and is oriented to as an information-seeking question by Emma in her response 
in turn 13 (“maybe yeah”). In the first possible space to respond to Chris’s ut-
terance, then, Emma orients to his utterance at the level of what is said. Chris 
then seeks confirmation of the veracity of the information in turn 14 with a 
truncated polar-interrogative (“yeah?”), to which Emma reconfirms, in turn 16, 
her prior response in turn 13. She appends in the same turn a new turn-
construction unit, which involves yet another polar-interrogative (“you got 
that?”). Chris then confirms that he does have the condition in question in turn 
17.
Emma’s polar-interrogative in turn 16 thus constitutes evidence that she has 
oriented to Chris’s utterance in turn 11 as possibly request implicative (i.e. that 
Chris would like to seek acupuncture treatment from her). In the minute or so 
of discourse that follows (data not shown) Emma goes on to ask Chris ques-
tions about his condition before leading into a tentative offer of treatment 
(turns 288, 291), which is subsequently tentatively accepted by Chris (turn 
298), as evident in the excerpt below.
(3) ERCH: 9:40 –9:56
288 E: [BUT] I don’t know how (0.3) u::h
289 C: [oh ]
290  (1.0)
291 E: like (0.5) I don’t know if I could get a
  lasting result I don’t know if I could cure
  it but I could [certainly] probably improve it
292 C:  [yeah  ]
293  (0.5)
294 C: yeah (0.2) ( ) your card [or a::h ]
295 E:  [↑YEAH I’ll] give
  ya a card
296 C: yeah
297 E: I’ll give ya a card [now ]
298 C:  [willing] to give anything a go
It is evident from previous studies of the sequential development of requests 
in English (Curl and Drew 2008; Heinemann 2006; Schegloff 2007: 62, 90; 
Stevanovic 2011) that Chris’s utterance would be recognizable to the partici-
pants as a possible pre-request in that it involves an information-seeking ques-
tion that could be understood as “gaug[ing] the likelihood of a possible request 
being granted before it is performed” (Liddicoat 2007: 132). That it is recog-
nized as pre-request implicative is evident from Emma’s subsequent offer of 
treatment for Chris’s condition.
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While at first glance a consideration of the sequential development of this 
“question-answer” sequence in turns 11–17 (or turns 226 –232 in the full tran-
script), and the subsequent offer in turns 288–298 might seem irrelevant to 
the analysis of Chris’s utterance in turn 11 as request-implicative, it is in fact 
critical. This is because although one might assume that the preferred (in the 
CA sense of normative) response would be a go-ahead response leading into 
a request by Chris, Schegloff (2007) points out that the “the preferred re-
sponse to the pre-request is to pre-empt the need for a request altogether by 
offering that which is to be requested” (90, emphasis added). And this is indeed 
exactly what happens in this interaction. Emma pre-empts the need for Chris to 
make his request explicit through an offer that is followed by a line of pre-
consultation type questioning where Emma assesses whether she is able to 
 offer treatment for Chris’s condition. This is important to note because it 
 undermines Wedgwood’s (2011) first “alternative” reading of Chris’s utter-
ance, namely, that, “Chris’s attempt to communicate in line 11 is initially just 
not very successful” (536). In fact, the two participants develop an understand-
ing of Chris’s utterance in turn 11 as request implicative consistent with nor-
mative or preferred ways of responding to recognizable pre-requests, namely, 
with preemptive offers, as found in extensive empirical analyses of requests in 
situated, naturally occurring discourse. I might add that labeling an utterance 
as “successfully” or “unsuccessfully” communicating something constitutes 
Wedgwood’s evaluation of that excerpt, but this evaluation is not evidenced 
with reference to the data at hand, and thus does not amount to empirical 
 analysis.
The analysis of Chris’s utterance in turn 11 as implicative of a possible chal-
lenging tease (i.e., something like, “but could you treat something like this?”) 
can also be also tied to the interactional data at hand. The first thing to note 
in examining the plausibility of this “possible understanding” of the utterance 
as implying a teasing challenge is the design of the turn and what precedes it. 
The utterance itself is delivered with “compressed” intonation, apart from the 
utterance-final rising intonation, which is consistent with studies of the intona-
tion of mockery (Attardo et al 2003; Keltner et al. 2001: 324). A laughter par-
ticle is also appended (“heh”) immediately following the polar-interrogative. 
On its own, the interpretation of the laughter particle is of course equivocal, 
but it is important to note that utterance-final laughter particles have been dem-
onstrated to orient the recipient to the possibility of joining in to laugh about a 
possible mocking remark (Glenn 2003; Jefferson 1979; Schenkein 1972). In 
other words, through the laughter particle, the possibility of a non-serious or 
jocular interpretation of Chris’s utterance (i.e., as a tease) is made available. 
The possible understanding of the utterance as implicating a teasing challenge 
arises from the content of the interrogative itself, embedded within which there 
is a particular candidate answer (Pomerantz 1988), namely, that Emma can, or 
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perhaps cannot, treat patellar tendonitis. The plausibility of the analysis of this 
utterance as implying a possible teasing challenge is further evidenced in the 
fact that Emma has been extolling the advantages of acupuncture to Chris. 
Some of this was shown in the excerpt I analyzed, although Emma had in fact 
been talking about acupuncture for most of their conversation. As Drew (1987) 
points out in a study of teasing and tease responses in English, mockery may 
be locally occasioned in response to the target “over doing” or exaggerating a 
particular action, in this case, extolling the virtues of acupuncture. Indeed, we 
can find an example of Emma and Chris recognizably achieving a jocular tease 
in response to Emma extolling the virtues of her acupuncture teacher later in 
that same conversation (Haugh 2010a: 2113–2114). The strongest evidence, 
however, that a teasing challenge is potentially implied here by Chris is an 
exchange between them that occurs just over a minute prior to that excerpt, 
which is reproduced below:
(4) ERCH: 7:03–7:15
181 C: so what’s the basic idea behind acupuncture?
  I mean [I know a little about] it but, [you know]
182 E:  [OH COME ON HEH] [.Hhhhh ]
183  (0.3)
184 C: I mean
185  (0.4)
186 E: u::m=
187 C: does it wo(hh)rk? kheh
188 E: ye:ah it works=
189 C: ye(hh)h?
190 E: yeah yeah it really works (0.3) there’s no
  (.) no question about it working (0.5) but
  nobody knows exactly what the mechanism is (0.5)
  scientifically
Here, we see that Emma orients to Chris’s question in turn 181 as implying he 
is skeptical or doubtful about the effectiveness of acupuncture by responding 
in turn with a display of possible exasperation (“oh come on”) delivered in a 
markedly louder voice with laughter (turn 182). Chris’s implied challenge is 
subsequently made more explicit when he asks whether it works (turn 187). 
The occurrence of laughter particles, including the utterance-final “heh” here 
orients Emma to the possibility of joining in to laugh about the question, 
thereby framing it as non-serious or teasing in nature. Emma asserts, in re-
sponse, that it does work (turn 188), and reconfirms this in turn 190, in re-
sponse to Chris seeking further confirmation (turn 189). The fact that Chris 
seeks further confirmation is once again implicative of his possible skepti-
cism. Emma then moves into an explanation of how acupuncture works in 
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“non-scientific” terms (turn 190), which continues on until Chris’s question 
about patellar tendonitis in turn 11 (or turn 226 in the complete transcript).
It is important, then, to note that, through this, Chris and Emma have estab-
lished Chris’s possible skepticism about the efficacy of acupuncture, which is 
particularly salient in that this is the first time they have met. They have also 
jointly accomplished a non-serious or jocular frame in orienting to the issue 
of the efficacy (or not) of acupuncture. Also quite striking is the similarity in 
utterance design between Chris’s prior utterance in turn 187 (“does it work? 
heh”) which is demonstrably oriented to by both as a tease, and his subsequent 
utterance in turn 226 (“can you fix patellar tendonitis? heh”). Interpreting 
Chris’s utterance in turn 11 (or turn 226 in the full transcript) as implicative of 
a teasing challenge is thus indeed a possible understanding at play here, as 
evidenced by close examination of the design of the turn itself, as well as what 
precedes it, in conjunction with prior studies of recognizable practices of teas-
ing in English.
The fact that Emma does not orient to this possible understanding (or provi-
sional interpreting) in subsequent turns means that this understanding remains 
simply that: a possible understanding that is not interactionally foregrounded. 
As I previously argued, what is conjointly co-constituted by Emma and Chris 
is an understanding of Chris’s utterance as information-seeking as well as 
 request-implicative. But this does not preclude the possibility of other under-
standings. It would be a mistake for us, as analysts, to ignore evidence from 
studies of interaction that point to the emergence of multiple understandings 
of meaning and action amongst participants at times, some of which may be 
interactionally foregrounded and some of which may not. It is the contingency 
of such understandings, and the ways in which they can be foregrounded or 
backgrounded, which underpins the inherently dynamic nature of meaning in 
interaction.
(4) Having carefully unpacked my prior analysis, I now turn to the other 
“readings” of Chris’s utterance that Wedgwood (2011) offers. He first claims 
that “it is possible [ . . . ] that Chris actually intends to project indeterminacy or 
vagueness through his line 11 utterance” (536). There is very little evidence to 
support this reading because Emma and Chris jointly accomplish an under-
standing of his utterance as a pre-request implicative in a manner consistent 
with a normative practice of pre-empting request with an offer (Schegloff 
2007: 90). Attributing the “design” and sequential placement of this utterance 
to simply issues of “politeness/face-saving” thus constitutes a very superficial 
analysis indeed. That is not to say that such issues do not arise, but they need 
to be examined in conjunction with a fully developed analysis of the interac-
tional achievement of meanings and actions in this interaction, not as a substi-
tute for close analysis. The second reading that Wedgwood offers is that Chris 
is “deliberately changing the subject” (fn. 4, 540) through this utterance. It is 
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difficult to understand on what grounds Wedgwood considers this a “change of 
subject,” since this question still remains broadly focused on the efficacy of 
acupuncture. There is, in any case, nothing to indicate in the design or sequen-
tial placement of this question to suggest that we are dealing with “topic shift,” 
as any cursory examination of the literature would suggest (Jefferson 1993; 
Schegloff 1990, 2007: 169–180). To put it simply, there is no evidence in the 
data at hand that we are dealing with a “change of subject.” Thus, while Wedg-
wood (2011) argues there are other equally plausible interpretations of Chris’s 
utterance in turn 11, and assumes that my analysis is simply an “intuitive read-
ing” of the interaction (536), I would counter that the interpretations that 
Wedgwood offers are speculative and not justified by the data at hand, and that 
his appeal to intentions forces him to engage in the “intuitive reading” that he 
protests against. The fact that Wedgwood fails to identify with any certainty 
Chris’s “local” intention, despite that fact that Emma and Chris evidently do 
understand each other, and that his attempts to do so lead him to make unsub-
stantiated claims about the utterance being “unsuccessful,” or an indication of 
Chris having a “vague” intention, or even an attempt to “change the subject,” 
affirms my point that speculation about a priori intentions is analytically un-
productive. Rather than speculating about the putative intentions of speakers, 
then, it is much more productive, I would contend, to carefully examine the 
design and content of utterances themselves, as well as the responses of par-
ticipants, and thus ground the analyst’s interpretations of possible understand-
ings of participants through close examination of the interactional data at hand, 
in conjunction with careful reading of prior studies in the literature that deal 
with similar phenomena.9
(5) Finally, I turn to the issue of the implications of this analysis for how 
we might frame the possible sociocognitive processes at play here.10 The first 
thing to note is that we are potentially dealing with a possible higher-order in-
tention here, namely, Chris’s possible desire to seek treatment for his condi-
tion. However, this higher-order intention cannot be pinned down anywhere in 
this particular conversation, never mind to his utterance in turn 11. Thus “lo-
cating” a higher-order intention here proves no easier than locating a commu-
nicative intention. There is one important difference, however, when consider-
ing the two. This arises from the fact that Chris’s utterance in turn 11 (or turn 
226 in the full transcript) marks a possible beginning to a different participa-
tion framework (Goffman 1981) in this conversational interaction. Up until 
that point in the conversation, Chris and Emma have been engaging in the ac-
tivity of what might be loosely termed “getting acquainted” (Haugh 2011; 
Maynard and Zimmerman 1984; Svennevig 1999). In such conversations, spe-
cific interactional “goals” are less evident, or at least are rather broad in nature 
relating to the desire to “get on” with someone or establish a “good start” to a 
relationship and so on. Chris’s utterance, however, proffers a different kind of 
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participation framework, namely, a consultation about his condition with a 
professional working in “alternative” medicine. Part of the new interpretative 
frame that this participation framework engenders is an understanding that a 
“patient” (here ostensibly Chris) normally has a “goal,” namely, to receive 
treatment. The question is how do they achieve intersubjectivity in regard to 
this broad interpretative frame? To put it in other terms, how is it that they 
reach an understanding that they are jointly engaged in a “medical consulta-
tion” rather than ( just) “getting acquainted”? In a broadly Gricean framework, 
we might argue that it is through Emma recognizing Chris’s communicative 
intention behind his utterance in turn 11, that she attributes a higher-order in-
tention (to possibly seek treatment), which in turn leads them to we-intend the 
activity of “consulting.” But this does not explain how in the course of this 
specific point in the interaction they could jointly reach such understandings. 
Wedgwood (2011) provides no analysis of this issue as a result of his singular 
focus on “local” intentions, but it is an important puzzle that any account of the 
cognitive processes underlying (and perhaps sometimes driving) conversa-
tional interaction must solve.
I would suggest that any attempt to solve the puzzle of how such intersub-
jectivity is accomplished needs to start by appreciating that any such account 
must be responsive to the interdependent nature of the inferential work under-
pinning this sequence (cf. Haugh 2009). This analysis of the way in which in-
ferences about this utterance become interdependent draws from Arundale’s 
(2010) distinction between provisional and operative interpretings. A provi-
sional interpreting of an utterance is an understanding on the part of one par-
ticipant that is “not yet assessed in view of uptake” by the other participant (or 
participants) (2080). In other words, the recipient(s) have not yet displayed 
evidence of their understanding of the utterance in a subsequent turn. This does 
not mean that a participant is necessarily uncertain about his or her understand-
ing, but simply that it has not been grounded with reference to the responses of 
others to that utterance. An operative interpreting of an utterance is an under-
standing of one participant that has been “assessed in view of uptake” by other 
participants (2080), although this does not mean that a participant cannot sub-
sequently change his or her understanding in light of further interaction. Both 
provisional and operative interpretings are necessarily contingent; the distinc-
tion rests on whether or not they are grounded in subsequent uptake by another 
participant or participants. In order to make the discussion of this complex 
 issue tractable I will offer a simplified version of a short portion of the excerpt 
starting with Chris’s utterance in turn 11.
(5)
Chris’s utterance a: can you fix patellar tendonitis?
Emma’s utterance b: maybe yeah
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Chris’s utterance c: yeah?
Emma’s utterance d: yeah you got that?
Chris’s utterance e: I have yeah
Some of the main inferences that arise here if we take it as given that an opera-
tive interpreting of utterance a as pre-request implicative is displayed by 
Emma through utterance d, and by Chris through utterance c, can be outlined 
as follows:
C1:  Chris’s inference of Emma’s projected interpreting of his utterance a.
E1:  Emma’s inference of Chris’s provisional interpreting of his utterance a.
C2:  Chris’s inference of Emma’s provisional interpreting of his utterance a 
in light of her utterance b.
E2:  Emma’s inference of Chris’s operative interpreting of his utterance a in 
light of his utterance c.
C3:  Chris’s inference of Emma’s operative interpreting of his utterance a in 
light of her utterance d.
What can be seen here is that Chris’s inference about Emma’s operative inter-
preting of utterance a (C3) is dependent on Emma’s display of her inference 
about Chris’s operative interpreting of utterance a (E2), as well as his infer-
ence about Emma’s provisional interpreting of utterance a (C2), which is de-
pendent, in turn, on Emma’s display of her inference about Chris’s provisional 
interpreting of utterance a (E1), and Chris’s initial inference about Emma’s 
projected interpreting of utterance a (C1). It follows that Chris’s final infer-
ence at this point in the sequence (C3) is afforded and constrained by his own 
prior inferences (C2, C1), as well as inferences made evident by Emma (E2, 
E1), which are in turn, afforded and constrained by inferences that Chris has 
made evident (C2). This means that Chris’s inference about Emma’s operative 
interpreting of utterance a is interdependent as it is afforded and constrained 
by Emma’s inferences, which are in turn afforded and constrained by Chris’s 
inferences. It is important to note that this cognitive interdependence is 
achieved across turns at talk not at any one single turn. It is thus of a different 
order of reflexivity than that involved in attributing communicative intentions. 
It is for this reason that conversational interaction requires consideration not 
only of monadic, independent cognitive processes (e.g., those leading to C1), 
but also dyadic, interdependent cognitive processes (e.g., those leading to C3). 
It is only with reference to the latter, interdependent cognitive processes, as 
well as traditional monadic cognitive processes, that we can hope to explain 
how Emma and Chris reach an understanding that they have shifted from an 
interpretative frame of getting acquainted into a pre-medical consultation.
The point that Wedgwood seems to fail to appreciate is that my analysis, 
which draws in part from research and methods in conversation analysis, 
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but which is ultimately broadly contextualized within the Conjoint Co-
Constituting Model of communication (Arundale 1999, 2010), is in reality 
rather cognitive in focus. Wedgwood’s (2011) assertion that “interactional” ap-
proaches neglect the cognitive dimension of communication perhaps rests on 
the assumption that any discussion of cognition that is not framed with refer-
ence to “local” or communicative intentions (i.e., on his terms) is by definition 
not cognitive in focus. But one wonders what provisional and operative inter-
pretings, inferences, expectations, beliefs, and the like are if not cognitive? The 
point I have tried to make here is that while individuals are obviously cogni-
tively autonomous, cognitive processes themselves may either remain inde-
pendent or become interdependent. It is the latter that has been neglected in 
accounts of communicative interaction that attempt to reduce everything to 
communicative or “local” intentions.
5.	 Concluding	remarks:	Toward	a	cognition	for	interaction
I would like to conclude this response, having disagreed with almost every 
claim made by Wedgwood (2011), by highlighting at least one point on which 
I think we do agree. He suggests early in his paper that,
interactional and emergent phenomena necessarily involve the interaction of something 
and emergence from something, and that proper explanation of such phenomena should 
elucidate, where possible, the relationship between the emergent phenomena and the 
nature of individual contributions to the interactions that produce them. (518, original 
emphasis)
I could not agree more (despite Wedgwood’s claim to the contrary), although 
we appear to disagree on how to accomplish this. There is clearly very fruitful 
work that can be done in collaborations between more cognitively and more 
interactionally focused researchers in pragmatics. And indeed there are a num-
ber of approaches being developed that focus on doing just that. The sociocog-
nitive model being developed by Kecskes (2010) is one example. The incre-
mental model of utterance processing being developed by Gregoromichelaki 
et al. (2011) is another. And, of course, the Conjoint Co-Constituting Model 
of communication is yet another (Arundale 1999, 2010; Arundale and Good 
2002). All of these models have one thing in common, namely, they are respon-
sive (to varying degrees) to requirements that interaction places on cognition. 
They differ in their understandings of intention, and in their relative commit-
ment (or not) to making recourse to intention attribution in accounts of mean-
ing in interaction (Arundale 2008, this issue; Levinson 2006a, 2006b). Clearly 
much more work remains to be done to address the complex issues raised here, 
including the place of intentions and intentionality in an account of cognition 
for interaction.
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My contention is that there are multiple methodological perspectives we can 
draw from in further developing such an account, ranging from philosophical 
considerations of intention to the analysis of interactional data, through to ex-
perimental work employing techniques inherited from neuroscience. Of course, 
we should be wary that methodological eclecticism does not unwittingly gen-
erate theoretical or analytical incoherence. And indeed, reiterating what I wrote 
in my introduction to the special issue of Intercultural Pragmatics on inten-
tion, we must also necessarily discard certain views and develop new alterna-
tives in the course of this endeavor (Haugh 2008a: 107). However, this process 
of discarding certain views and developing new alternatives should be 
grounded in an appreciation of the different understandings of intention that 
exist in pragmatics, as well as a healthy respect for the methodological com-
mitments of different approaches to the analysis of pragmatic phenomena. In 
that way dialogue across disciplines can be fruitful rather than divisive. The 
questions I raised in relation to the role of communicative intentions in the 
analysis of conversational interaction were intended as a way of opening up 
dialogue. A rebuttal such as Wedgwood’s that attempts to shut down such dis-
cussions is, in my view, counterproductive to say the least. As I previously 
concluded:
disciplines do not advance by avoiding the slippery questions that lay at their very 
foundations. It is in dealing with seemingly intractable issues that we can see with 
greater clarity through to the epistemological, ontological, and methodological assump-
tions underlying different research traditions in pragmatics. (Haugh 2008a: 107)
It is in that spirit I offer this response to Wedgwood’s (2011) attempted critique 
and to those who are interested in the complex issues that it raises.
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Notes
 1. The overview of intention and intentionality in this section is necessarily compressed. For a 
more in-depth overview see Bara (2010, 2011) or Haugh and Jaszczolt (2012).
 2. It has been pointed out that Grice’s formulation of communicative intention actually in-
volved two degrees of reflexivity, as the second-order intention (that the first-order intention 
to inform or represent be recognized by the hearer) was further embedded within a third-
order intention (i.e., to intend that the hearer’s recognition of the first-order intention be the 
reason for the hearer recognizing the speaker’s second-order intention), although the utility 
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of this third-order intention has been disputed (Bara 2010: 82–83; Searle 2007: 14). For the 
sake of exposition, I will only make reference to the simpler second-order communicative 
intention, which is preferred by Relevance theorists, for instance.
 3. Consistent with this general assumption, Wedgwood (2011) characterizes intentions as, 
“ ‘what the speaker wants to get across’ through a particular utterance, at the point at which 
it is formulated ” (526, emphasis added).
 4. By “cooperative,” it is not meant “agreeable” or the like, but simply that no individual can 
accomplish the activity in question on his or her own.
 5. See Haugh and Jaszczolt (2012: 106 –108) for a brief overview of this fascinating new line 
of research on the cognitive states-processes underlying communication.
 6. This is not to suggest that the definition and theorization of impoliteness is in any way settled 
(see Bousfield 2010 for a spirited defense of an intention-based model of impoliteness), but 
only to point out that coherent accounts of sociocultural-interactional” features of dialogue 
need not necessarily treat intention recognition as ineliminable contra Wedgwood (2011: 
537).
 7. Interestingly, Haugh’s (2010b) analysis of the interactional achievement of co-constructions 
indicates that first speakers (i.e., those who initiate the co-construction) hold themselves 
committed to and thus primarily accountable for those co-constructed utterances as opposed 
to the interlocutor who “finishes” the utterance. This could be taken as evidence of an orien-
tation to the first speaker’s intentions (in the folk, discursive sense), but as previously dis-
cussed, this does not constitute evidence that interlocutors are necessarily inferring the 
speaker’s communicative intentions (Gregoromichelaki et al. 2011). What this does illustrate 
is the utility of allowing for multiple understandings of intention.
 8. Wedgwood’s (2011) “critique” of the bias toward the “analyst’s omniscient perspective” 
(533) in my analysis thus fails to recognize that there are alternative ways in which to con-
ceptualize and analyze the “participant’s perspective” in empirically grounded ways.
 9. Wedgwood (2011) allows for only one understanding of the “participant’s viewpoint,” 
namely, the “internal states of the individual” (534) in terms of presumed “mechanisms of 
communication” (533). He thus fails to appreciate the very different approach to conceptual-
izing the participant’s viewpoint in CA, where the analyst’s interpretation is grounded in 
evidence participants provide to one another of their interpretations of the interactional im-
port of utterances (among other things).
 10. See Haugh (2012: 261–266) for another account of emergence in interaction and its implica-
tions for traditional accounts of the cognitive processes assumed to underlie communicative 
interaction.
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Appendix:	Transcription	conventions	(following	Jefferson	2004)
[ ] overlapping speech
(0.5) numbers in brackets indicate pause length
(.) micropause
: elongation of vowel or consonant sound
- word cut-off
. falling or final intonation
? rising intonation
¿ falling then rising intonation
, ‘continuing’ intonation
= latched utterances
underlining contrastive stress or emphasis
CAPS markedly louder
° ° markedly soft
Hhh in-breathing
↓ ↑ sharp falling/rising intonation
* * hearably smiling voice
> < talk is compressed or rushed
< > talk is markedly slowed or drawn out
( )  blank space in parentheses indicates uncertainty about the 
 transcription
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